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THE INDEPENDENCE AXIOM AND ASSET RETURNS
ABSTRAcr
Thispaper integrates models of atemporal risk preference that
relax the independence axiom into a recursive intertemporal
asset-pricing framework. The resulting models are amenable to
empirical analysis using market data and standard Euler equation
methods. We are thereby able to provide the first
non-laboratory-based evidence regarding the usefulness of several
new theories of risk preference for addressing standard problems in
dynamic economics. Using both stock and bond returns data, we find
that a model incorporating risk preferences that exhibit first-
order risk aversion accounts for significantly more of the mean and
autocorrelation properties of the data than models that exhibit
only second-order risk aversion. Unlike the latter class of models
which require parameter estimates that are outside of the
admissible parameter space, e.g., negative rates of time
preference, the model with first-order risk aversion generates
point estimates that are economically meaningful. We also examine
the relationship between first-order risk aversion and models that
employ exogenous stochastic switching processes for consumption
growth.
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and NBER1.INTRODUCTION
The expected utility model of decision making under risk, and
particularly its cornerstone the independence axiom, have come under attack
recently. The empirical evidence upon which this criticism is based consists
mostly of behavioral/experimental studies where subjects' choices amongst
hypothetical and/or small scale gambles are observed (e.g., Kahnesan and
Tversky (1979), ChewandWailer (1986), Camerer (1989a, 1989b) and
Conlisk (1989)). Hachina (1982) surveys much of the evidence and argues that
violations of the independence axiom are both systematic and widespread. A
number of new theories of choice under uncertainty have been developed in an
attempt to explain the evidence which contradicts expected utility theory.
Those upon which we focus here are due to Chew (1983, 1989), and Gul (1991).
In this paper we use the general intertemporal asset—pricing model
developed in Epstein and Zin (1989) and aggregate monthly U.S. time-series
data for consumption and asset returns as the basis for an empirical
examination of the generalized theories of Chew and Gui. In common with much
of the empirical literature on aggregate consumption and asset returns, we
assume the existence of a representative agent, the homotheticity of
preferences and the rationality of expectations.We Inquire whether, given
these assumptions, relaxing the independence axiom in the directions defined
by Chew and Gui can help account for the time—series data. To our knowledge
this is the first evidence available regarding the usefulness of these newly
developed theories of choice for explaining market data, Of course, tests of
a theory based on behavior In the field (as opposed to the laboratory) are
prone to potentially serious problems such as errors In data measurement and
unavoidable joint hypotheses.Laboratory—based methods, however, also have
well—known drawbacks and the behavioral evidence Is inconclusive. Some
recent behavioral studies(e.g.,Conlisk (1989),Camerer (1989b)and
Harrison (1990)) have cast doubt upon the extent and systematic nature ofviolations of expected utility theory.Thus we feel that an analysis based
upon market data would provide an important complementary piece of evidence
regarding the usefulness of the generalized theories of choice. Moreover, we
suspect that many economists would attach greater importance to the question
of whether these new theories do (or do not) help to resolve some of the
standard problems in economics, than to their consistency with laboratory
behavior. The explanation of asset returns clearly qualifies as such a
standard problem.
Representative agent models, with preferences represented by the
expected value of the discounted sum of within—period utilities, have not
performed well In explaining the behavior of consumption and asset returns
over time(e.g..Hansen and singleton (1982, 1983)and Mehra and
Prescott (1985)). This In part motivates the work In Epstein and Zin (1989)
which formulates a class of intertemporal utility functions which are
recursive but not necessarily additive or consistent with expected utility
theory. Recursive utility permits some degree of separation in the modelling
of risk aversion and intertemporal substitution.In Epstein and ZIn (1991),
generalized method of moments estimation procedures are applied to the Euler
equations implied by a particular parametric member of this class of utility
functions.The results are mixed though some support is provided for the
generalized specification.The functional form used in that study does not
conform with intertemporal expected utility. However, it satisfies the
independence axiom for the set of so—called timeless wealth gambles——those
for which all uncertainty is resolved before further consumption/savings
decisions are made. Since these are precisely the sort of gambles that are
considered in the experimental literature, the specification of Intertemporal
utility that is estimated in Epstein and Zin (1991) is inconsistent with the
cited evidence against the independence axiom.This paper focuses on the
empirical gains from further generalizations of intertemporal utility tospecifications in which orderings of timeless wealth gambles conform with the
theories of Chew and Gui and not necessarily with the independence axiom.
The Euler equations implied by a representative agent's consumption/
portfolio selection problem form the basis for the empirical analysis. We
first make graphical comparisons of the mean/variance properties of the
stochastic discount rates, I.e., the marginal rates of intertemporal
substitution, that are implied by the Euler equations for each model. In
addition, these mean/variance properties can be used as in Hansen and
Jagannathan (1991), to form an informal test of these asset pricing models.
Second, we provide a more formal statistical analysis based on the
generalized method of moments, Finally, we explore the relationship between
the general preference-based models and standard expected utility models in
which consumption growth rates are subject to exogenous stochastic process
switching.
The paper proceeds as follows: The next two sections lay the groundwork
for the empirical analysis by summarizing and applying the most relevant
material from the two literatures on decision theory and intertemporal asset
pricing. In section 2,the Chew (1983, 1989) and Gul (1991) utility
functions are described. Section 3 outlines their integration into a
recursive model of intertemporal utility based on Epstein and Zin (1989) and
presents the implied model of asset returns. Section 4 contains the
empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes and summarizes the paper.
2.CERTAINTY EQUIVALENTS FOR TIMELESS WEALTH GAMBLES
In this section we summarize the relevant aspects of the Utility
functionsproposedbyChew (1983, 1989) and Gui (1991). These functions
represent preferences over atemporal or one—shotgambles.Integration into a
multiperiodsetting is described inthe next section.
Considera utility function i defined on a subset of D(R1). the set of
3cumulative distribution functions (cdf's) F on the positive real line. If
x > 0, then ,representsthe gamble in which the outcome x is certain;
(y) =0if y < x and(y) =1if y a x.Similarly, F = p1 represents
1=1 I
the gamble in which the outcome x is realized with probability p,
1=1,2 n.
Only the ordinal properties of iarerelevant.Without essential loss
of generality, therefore, we can assume that
(2.1) p(s) =x.for all x >0.
As a result, assigns to any cdf F its certainty equivalent, i.e., that
wealth level x much that receiving x with certainty is Indifferent to the
gamble represented by F.Thus we refer to as a certainty equivalent
function.
Consistent with the relevant empirical literature on intertemporal asset
pricing and consumption, we assume that M exhibits constant relative risk
aversion. That is, for any random variable x with cdf
(2.2) 1(Fx) =Xi(F—),for all A>O.
The functional forms for giconsideredin this paper are all special cases of
the following, which represents the constant—relative—risk—averse members of







Under suitable assumptions for the valuation function, v, and for the lower
and upper weight functions w1 and w0, equation (2.3) defines (F) implicitly
4for each cdf F.Note that idefinedin this way satisfies the certainty
equivalent condition (2.1) if •(1) =0.
Though the general form of (2.2) has an intuitive interpretation, (See
below), we find It instructive to restrict our attention initially to the
parametric specializations we will use in our empirical investigation.
Accordingly, restrict the vaiuation and weight functions to have the forms:




L 6 u .5 w(x)=x and w(x)=Ax.
Consider the further parametric restrictions:
(2.6) 0<Aaianda+26<1.
In the Appendix it is shown that given (2.4)—(2.6), we can find an interval
Ia,b), depending on a and6,0<a<l<b, such that equation (2.3) defines p(F)
implicitly for all cdf's on the positive real line which have support in
(a,bJ. Furthermore, on this domain, M is strictly monotone in the sense of
first—degree stochastic dominance, implies risk aversion in the sense of
strict aversion to mean preserving spreads and exhibits constant relative
risk aversion. Finally, under some auxiliary assumptions. giiswell—defined
and well-behaved in the above sense for all cdf's having finite mean and
support in the positive real line. Those assumptions are:
(i) .5 =0and a <1,or
(2.7) (ii) 6 <0and 0 <a+8(1,or
(iii)0<6<1 and a+6<0.
Turn to some speciai cases.For greater ease of interpretation, we
express the functional forms for cdf's having finite support.
5Expected Utility (50. A 1)
With these parameter restrictions we obtain the linearly homogeneous
expected utility certainty equivalent:
a I/a ((Epx) a0,
(2.8) =
1 i exp( p1log(x1)), a =0.
The Arrow—Pratt measure of relative risk aversion equals I—a.
Weighted Utility (A =1)
The constant—relative—risk—averse form of Chews (1983) weighted utility
theory is given by
i.e 1/a
Epx





Note that is a single—parameter extension of (2.8). The connection
between expected and weighted utility is clarified by reference to their
implied indifference curves in the probability simplex for the case of
three—outcome gambles (n =3). (See Figure 1).It is well—known that the
indifference curves of Mw are parallel straight lines. For
indifference curves remain linear but if S * 0 they emanate from a finite
point, Q,Inthe plane; Qrecedesto infinity as 540.
In the triangle shown, indifference curves corresponding to higher
levels of utility are steeper. Such indifference curves are said to fan out.
Machlna (1982), via his Hypothesis II, points out the close connection
between fanning out and consistency with Allais—type behavior and the
empirical patterns that have come to be known as the common consequence
6effect and the common ratio effect. But recent behavioral evidence regarding
fanning out is inconclusive (see the papers by Camerer and Conlisk).
Fortunately, if 8 > 0, weIghted utility also admits fanningin, wherethe the
point Q lies to the north—east of the triangle and higher Indifference curves
are flatter.In Section 4 below we are able to exploit this flexibility of
weighted utility to Investigate whether fanning in or fanning out Is
indicated by financial market data.
The degree of risk aversion implicit in is of interest.It follows
from Chew (1983. p.lO83) that the risk premium for a random variable with
mean x and a small variance o'2x2 is approximately xc2(1—a-26)/2. Thus
(1—a—28) is a measure of relative risk aversion for small gambles about
certainty. Risk aversion increases as a or 8 falls.
Disappointment Aversion (8 0)
If we set 8 =0in (2.4) then (2.3) Implies the following functional
form, which is the constant—relative—risk—averse specialization of the
utility functions axiomatized by Gul (1991): PDA(t p18 )is the unique
solution to





p1iog x1 + (A1—1) Ep1(Iogx1—iogMD). a 0.
x <p
I0*
This functional form provides an alternative single parameter extension
of expected utility for which A =1.The generalization to A < 1 admits the
following psychological interpretation. Refer to an outcome x1 as
disappointing if It is worse than expected in the sense of being smaller than
the certainty equivalent of the gamble according to p0k. In (2.10),
7disappointing outcomes generate negative values for the second summations on
the right sides, if A1—1 )0.Thus the certainty equivalent Is smaller than
It would be If A =1,reflecting an aversion to disappointment.2
The indifference curves for in the two—dimensional simplex are shown
in Figure 1. They are linear and emanate from two distinct points Q and Q',
both of which recede to infinity as A -1.Thus Indifference curves fan out
in the lower part of the triangle and otherwise fan in. It Is interesting to
note in this regard, that the behavioral evidence supporting fanning out is
weaker In the upper triangle than in the lower region. (See Conlisk, for
example.
Say that individual 1 is more risk averse than individual 2 If any
gamble that is rejected by 2 In favor of a certain prize is also rejected by
individual 1. With greater risk aversion defined accordingly, Gui shows that
risk aversion increases as s or A fails. An important feature of the risk
aversion embedded In gz is portrayed in Figure 2,which shows the
indifference curves in outcome space for binary gambles with fixed
probabilities p1 and p. For the expected utility functions p, the
corresponding indifference curves are tangent at the certainty line to the
actuarially fair market line of slope —p/p. Thus is risk neutral to
the first order (Arrow (1965)) and the risk premium for a small gamble is
proportional to its variance.In contrast, the tangency fails for p if
A <1,in which case the risk premium for a small binary gamble is
2Thereis a similarity in spirit between the structure of and the
hypothesis of Markowitz (1953)and Kahneman and Tversky (1979)that
individuals evaluate risky prospects in terms of gains and losses relative to
a reference position. Here the reference position is the certainty
equivalent of the gamble and the gains and losses are treated differently in
computing the utility of the prospect. Since the reference point is
endogenous and depends on the gamble in question, one obtains an ordering
based on final wealth positions. In the cited sources, an exogenously
specified reference position is taken to apply to all gambles under
consideration and the preference ordering Is defined on deviations from that
position.
8proportional to the standard deviation and we say that iexhibits
first—order risk aversion. (See Segal and Spivak (1990) for a general
treatment of first—order risk aversion and Epstein and Zin (1990) for an
application to asset pricing.
The most general specification considered in our empirical analysis is
(2.3)-(2.6).These functional forms represent a two-parameter, 6 *0and
A *1,extension of expected utility which contains both weighted utility and
disappointment—averse utility. The semi—weighted certainty equivalent,
p6 ), satisfies
(2.11) px(x' —ia)/a+(A1-1)p1x(x -)/c = 0,a *0,
x <LI SW
andsimilarly for a =0.
Itisstraightforward toprovide a disappointment—aversion
interpretation for A <1and also to show that the latter implies first—order
risk aversion.Risk aversion Increases as a, 6 or A falls.Finally, a
probability simplex indifference map for is shown in Figure 1. (Other
configurations for Q and Q are possible, though in all cases they are
collinear with the vertex p2 =1).All of the above certainty equivalents
share the property that indifference curves in the three—outcome probability
simplex are straight lines and more generally are hyperplanes in higher
dimensional simplices. Thus they satisfy the axiom of betweennesm, which is
a weakening of the independence axiom proposed and studied by
Fishburn (1983), Dekel (1986) andChew (1983,1989).
There exist in the literature alternative generalizations of expected
utility which can explain some of the accumulated behavioral evidence. Two
such alternatives are prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1979)), and
rank-dependent or anticipated utility theory (Quiggin (1982), Yaari (1987)
and Segal (1989), for example). But in each case, there are serious
9difficulties associated with adopting the corresponding functional forms in
the analysis to follow.For example, prospect theory violates first—degree
stochastic dominance unless potential violations are eliminated in a
preliminary editing phase, but a satisfactory specification of the latter is
not apparent to us. On the other hand, the central role played by the rank
ordering of outcomes in the structure of rank—dependent theory makes it
computationally intractable in our multiple asset portfolio choice context.
In contrast,there are no such difficulties associated with the
betweenness—conforming utility functions adopted here.Whether alternative
generalizations of the independence axiom and expected utility can help to
explain the data we study, must remain a subject for future research.
3.INTERTD(PORALASSET PRICINGWITH RECURSIVE UTILITY
The certainty equivalent functions of the last section are now
integrated into an infinite—horizon, intertemporal setting. Then we describe
the restrictions Implied for consumption and asset returns by the optimizing
behavior of a representative agent.The reader is referred to Epstein and
ZIn (1989) for the details which support the discussion In this section.
There is a single consumption good in each period. In period t, current
consumption, c, is known with certainty, but future consumption levels are
generally uncertain. Thus intertemporal utility is defined over random
consumption sequences.It is assumed that the intertemporal utility function
is recursive in the sense that the utility U, derived from consumption in
period t and beyond, satisfies the recursive relation
(3.1) Ut =W(c,ii),ta 0,
where p p(U) is the certainty equivalent of random future utility,
10conditional upon period t information.3The function W is called an
aggregator since itaggregatescurrentconsumption.c.witha
certainty—equivalent Index of the future in order to determine current
utility.
We restrict W to have the CES form
[(l-R)c + 0 * p < I,
(3.2) W(c, y) =
'.exp((l-)1og(c) + Riog(y)I, p =0,
where 0 < 1.The utility of deterministic consumption paths is given by
the CES intertemporal utility function
1/p
={ (l—Ø)cp]
withthe elasticity of intertemporal substitution given by o (l—p)1 and
the constant rate of time preference given by =(l/B)—l.We therefore
interpret p as an intertemporal substitution parameter.
For the certainty equivalent function p we take the semi—weighted form
p. In our earlier work we show that p represents the Implied preference
ordering over timeless wealth gambles. i.e., gambles in which all uncertainty
is resolved before further consumption takes place. Moreover, we have
already noted that all of the behavioral evidence referred to above regarding
individual choice under uncertainty is based on choices amongst timeless
gambles. Thus the preceding discussion of is pertinent.In particular.
risk aversion with respect to timeless wealth gambles is inversely related to
each of the parameters a, A and &
The specializations of p dIscussed above imply corresponding
Here we write p(U) as shorthand for p(F ), where F is the cdf
U U
— t,1
for U conditional upon period t information.
11subclasses of recursive intertemporal utility functions shown in Figure 3.
Note that the expected utility certainty equivalent specification g.i (see






expE(1—)E tJog(c)] a =0.
Rather, p leads to the infinite—horizon generalization of the Intertemporal
utility function of Kreps and Porteus (1978), explored empirically in Epstein
and Zin (1991). The specification (3.3) corresponds to the added restriction
that a =p,leaving only a single parameter to model both intertemporal
substitution and risk aversion. Our earlier work examined the empirical
gains from relaxing this constraint. This paper Is concerned with the
further gains from relaxing the parameter restrictions=0and A =1.
From the perspective of the latter objective, it is interesting to note
the following result due to Duffie and Epstein (1990). When recursive
utility Is suitably formulated in a continuous—time setting with a Brownian
information environment, weighted utility and expected utility certainty
equivalents are observationally equivalent to one another, whereas (and this
is strongly suggested, though not proven by their analysis) they are
distinguishable from p0. Moreover, the essential reason for this difference
between p nd p seems to be that the former alone satisfies first—order
DA WI)
risk aversion. Since in the present paper we are not assuming a
Brownlan—information, continuous—time setting, we cannot rule out the
potential empirical importance of the generalization from p ( 0, A =1),
to p (A =1).On the other hand, this result suggests that an empirical
analysis such as ours should include consideration of certainty equivalents
like p that exhibit first—order risk aversion.
DA
We now describe the implications for asset returns and consumption of a
12representative agent having recursive intertemporal utility.The agent is
assumed to operate In a standard competitive environment. There are N assets
and the ithassethas positive gross real return r when held over the
interval tt,t+i1. Denote by M,1 the return to the market portfolio over the
same interval.
In the Appendix we derive the following Euler equations which represent
first—order conditions for the representative agent's consumption/portfolio
choice problem:
(3.4) Eh()IG)( t,t.l = 0,t*j=l N, and
(3.5) E[()] =0
where: is defined by (2.4)—(2.5),
(3.6) z-'(c/c )'1'M11' p * 0, and t,I L.l t L.a
x6(xa(l+6/a) —6/a),a *0
(3.7) h(x)
x Ll+âlog(x)), a =0.
Above E is the expected value operator conditional on period t information




For these Euler equations to be valid in the general case where A a I we
must restrict the probability distribution of consumption growth and asset
returns as described in the Appendix.Sufficient conditions are that for
each information set at t:
(a) the conditional distribution of Er r Ihascompact I,t*I N,t,I
support in the positive orthant and
13(b) theconditionaldistributionof therandom variable
— (p—l)/p—1/p (c Ic ) M has a bounded density function.
t+1t t+1
According to the model of asset returns represented by (3.4), mean
excess returns are determined by covariances of returns with a function of
consumption growth and the return to the market.Of course, if A =1and
=0then one obtains the model of asset returns studied in Epstein and
Zin (1991) which has as special cases both the static CAPM when a =0,and
the consumption CAPM when a =p.This latter restriction corresponds to the
standard expected utility model studied by Hansen and Singleton (1982, 1983).
To obtain a set of restrictions that apply directly to the levels of
Individual asset returns, multiply (3.4) by the portfolio weights and sum
over all N securities to get
r( r 1
(3.8) C II (z)h(z H l1 =Eil (z)h(z)I. i1,..., N. tL A t*1 t*1 )J t A t*1 t.1 J
t+1
Now use (3.5) to rewrite (3.8) in the form
r
(3.9) E Ii()h( )I I = CIi()
tL A t+1 t1 )j tj A t1 t*1
t*1
which is an equation restricting the level of each return, 1=1 N
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
4. 1 The Marginal Rate of Intertemporal Substitution
The asset pricing model derived in the previous sections has the
geometric structure studied by Hansen and Richard (1987). That is, the model
predicts that equilibrium asset prices are determined by a marginal rate of
intertemporal substitution which discounts future asset payoffs before they
are averaged across states. For example, we can rewrite our model's
asset—pricing equation for excess returns given In (3.4) as
14(4.1) E (MRS( - )] = 0,
tt•1,t I,t*1J.t+1
wherethe marginal rate of intertemporal substitution of c1 for is
(4.2) MRS =h(zLI (), t.1,t. t*1t1 A t.1
for defined in (3.6).The marginal rate of intertemporal substitution






E Il (z )z
tLAt*1 t.i
We focus on the properties of MRS rather than on MRS since the latter
involves a conditional expectation which is difficult to compute.4
Figures 4 through 11 plot the ratio of the estimated standard deviation
of MRS to its mean for various parameter values. Consumption is measured as
monthly per capita expenditure on nondurables and services and the monthly
NYSE value—weighted return is used to measure the return on the aggregate
wealth portfolio5 for the time period 1959:3 to 1986:12. Each figure has
five graphs, one for each of the five choices for the first—order risk
aversion parameter, A.These values range from first—order risk neutrality,
A =1,to first—order risk aversion corresponding to A =0.3.The elasticity
of intertemporal substitution, a. a (1—pY1, varies across the figures and
takes on the values (0.01, 0.1, 0.5, lO to reflect varying degrees of
substitutability. For Figures 4 through 7 the additional risk-aversion
parameter for the weighted utility specification, & is held fixed at zero.
The metods of Gallant. Hansen and Tauchen (1989) could be used to
evaluate MRS by first fitting a semi—nonparametric estimator for the Joint
distribution of consumption growth and asset returns.
The consumption data (and corresponding implicti price deflator) are from
Cit ibase and the value—weighted return is from CRSP.
15Therefore, these figures pertain to the special case of disappointment
aversion. The parameter a is varied between —29 and 1,so that
(second-order) relative risk aversion varies from 0 to 30. In Figures 8
through 11, a is fixed at —1, andis allowed to vary so that the measure of
local (second—order) risk aversion, l—a—2, still varies from 0 to 30. In
all of the figures, the discount factor. .Isfixed at 0.9975 corresponding
to a 3 percent annual constant rate of time preference.
Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) show that the restrictions on the
covariances between MRS and asset returns implied by equations such as (4.1)
generate an inequality restriction for the ratio of the standard deviation to
the mean of MRS.They estimate this bound using various stock and bond
return data Including two cases that correspond to the data we use in Figures
4 through 11. Using the value-weighted return on the New York Stock Exchange
and the return on one—month Treasury bills.6 they estimate a bound of 0.14.
Using one—month holding period returns for Treasury bills with one to six
month maturities yields a substantially larger lower estimated bound for the
standard deviation—mean ratio of 0.79. It is clear from the sizable
difference in these numbers that term—structure evidence typically provides
more of a challenge for asset pricing models, e.g., Backus, Gregory and
Zin (1989).
The first four figures allow us to identify some special cases as well
as see some patterns in the behavior of the first two moments of MRS as the
preference parameters change. The expected utility hypothesis is depicted by
the point on each A =1graph where 1-1/e =a.That Is, the point where
RRA =10in Figure 5, RRA=2in Figure 6, and BRA =0.1In Figure 7•7 None
6Real returns are computed using the implicit deflator for monthly
consumption of nondurables and services.
In Figure 4, the expected utility model corresponds to a relative risk
aversion parameter of 100 on the A I graph and is not shown.
16of these points satisfies the Hansen—Jagannathan bound which is consistent
with existing empirical rejections of this theory.The Kreps—Porteus model
examined in Epstein and Zin (1991) is the remainder of the A =1graph.
Increasing (second—order) relative risk aversion has a small effect on the
standard deviation relative to the mean when deterministic consumption is
highly complementary (Figures 4 and 5) and the Hansen-Jagannathan bounds are
violated for even the most extreme cases of risk aversion. ihen
complementarity is smaller or when deterministic consumption is substitutable
(Figures 6 and 7), increasing relative risk aversion has a much larger effect
and the Hansen—Jagannathan bounds are satisfied for a range of relatively
large values for RRA. Another Important pattern to emerge from these figures
is the impact of smaller values of A on the behavior of MRS.The standard
deviation always gets larger relative to the mean as this parameter
decreases.That is, the MRSgetsmore volatile relative to its mean and,
hence, closer to the predictions of asset returns data, as A gets smaller.
The Hansen—Jagannathan bounds are satisfied for a large set of values for the
parameters when A <1.First—order risk aversion, therefore, helps move the
theory closer to observed behavior.In addition, uniike second—order risk
aversion, increases in first—order risk aversion continue to have a large
effect on the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean as intertemporal
complementarity increases.
The next four figures correspond to weighted and semi—weighted utility
generalizations in the 8 dimension. Recall that in these figures the
parameter a is constrained to equal —l and the parameter 6 varies so that
l—a—28 (the local measure or second—order relative risk aversion when A =1),
varies from 0 to 30.Values along the horizontal axis greater than 2,
therefore, imply fanning out, while values less than 2 imply fanning In. The
most striking feature of these figures is the way they closely mimic the
previous four figures in which .5 =0.This provides some confirmation of the
17theoreticalpredictionof Duffle and Epstein (1990) regarding the
observational equivaience of weighted utility and Ereps-Porteus utility.
4.2 GM!'! Estimation
Equations (3.5) and (3.9) form the basis of our statistical analysis of
the models discussed above. We concentrate on two assets, the value—weighted
return on stocks traded on the NYSE, and the return on a one—month treasury
bill.6 The existing body of empirical works suggests that the Joint behavior
of these two securities provides s challenge for any asset pricing model, We
treat the value—weighted return as a measure of the return on the aggregate
wealth portfolio and use equation (3.5) to model its behavior.We restrict
the t—bIll return with equation (3.9).Rewrite ex post versions of these
equations as
(4.4) 1 ( )I(—a—1)/al = , and A t+i t+it+1 ) t+1
(4.5) 1 G )1f-a (1+S/a)-S/a]f ]—8]=
At+1t+1 t+1 ) t+1J t+1
t.i
where z is defined in (3.6). These equations define the vector of
forecast errors, c =It6 which as discussed In section 4.1, has
t+l t+1 t+1
the property that
(4.6) E [ I=0. t t+1
Therefore, any variable that Is in the agent's Information set In period t is
orthogonal to the forecast error and can be used to construct an
unconditional moment restriction. These unconditional moment restrictions
can then be used to form a OHM estimator for the preference parameters.
The data span the 1959:3—1986: 12 time period.A complete description of
the data set can be found In Epstein and Zin (1991).







That is. we impose restrictions on the dynamic behavior of the forecast error
process.The linear restrictions implied by (4.7) can be summarized by ten
unconditional moments, the means, the first and second order autocovariances,
and the first and second order cross covariances, which must all be zero. The
use of lagged forecast errors as instruments is in part motivated by the
diagnostic testing of Euler equation residuals advocated by Singleton (1987).
In addition, the fact that these restrictions retain their precise meaning
for all model specifications, permits a more straightforward comparison
across models than does the more common practice of using arbitrary functions
of cx ante information as instruments.9 Tables 1 through 4 contain GMM
parameter estimates and diagnostic tests for a variety of special cases of
the general specifications in equations (4.4) and (4.5). In each case we use
two different measures of consumption. Consistent estimates are obtained in
a first round by minimizing the unweighted sum of squared errors from the ten
estimating equations.These estimates are used to construct a consistent
estimate of a weighting matrix which is used to obtain the consistent and
(relatively) efficient estimates (and their standard errors) presented In the
tables.10 We turn now to a discussion of these results.
Instrument choice also determines the relative efficiency of GMM
estimators. Optimal instrument choice requires knowledge of the conditional
expectation of the derivatives of the forecast errors with respect to the
model's parameters. Without explicit distributional assumptions, this choice
is typically infeasible.A casual argument for our choice of instruments
along these lines can be made given the exponential functional forms that we
are using.However, as with almost any instrument choice, this type of
argument is necessarily very informal.
The regularity conditions sufficient to yield consistent and
asymptotically normal GMM estimators based on (4.7) when A =Iare covered by
Hansen (1982). The fact that the instruments depend on unknown parameters is
of no consequence for these properties. When A * I the functions defining
19Expected Utility
Our starting point for G'festimationand tests of the over—Identifying
restrictions implied by (4.7), is the standard time—additive expected utility
model.Table 1 contains estimates and asymptotic standard errors for the
rate oftimepreferenceparameter, = the elasticityof
substitution/relative risk aversion parameter, u, and Hansen's chi—squared
test of the eight over—identifying restrictions (ten equations less two
estimated parameters).This model corresponds to equations (4.4) and (4.5)
with the additional restrictions of A =1(first—order risk neutrality),
=0(no fanning in or out), and a =p=1—1/u(substitution and risk
aversion tied together).
The results are not favorable to the model. The over—identifying
restrictions test Indicates that this model can be rejected at almost any
significance level.In addition, the estimated rate of time preference is
negative and significantly so for one of the consumption measures.
The lower part of the table contains the estimated moments (and their
asymptotic standard errors) and the diagonal elements of the weighting
matrix. The former give us an additional set of tests of the restrictions
of the model and the latter provide some information about how each equation
is weighted in the computation of the estimator. These help to identify
the directions in which the model is rejected.The forecast errors exhibit
significant first—order autocorrelation for both the stock and the bond
return equations.Note that the moments involving the bond equation error
have a corresponding diagonal element of the weighting matrix that is much
smaller than do those for the market equation error. The GMM estimator,
the forecast errors are not differentiable, hence, the standard results do
not necessarily apply. We can, however, appeal to arguments from the
empirical process literature that hold for nondifferentiable functions to
establish asymptotic normality of the CNN estimators based on the model with
A1.These arguments are outlined in part 3 of the Appendix.
20therefore, attaches relatively greater weight to the moments for the market
equation which accounts for the fact that their fitted values are typically
closer to zero than the others.
Kreps—Porteus Utility
By dropping the constraint that ap but retaining the restrictions
A1 and .50, we obtain the Kreps-Porteus model from Epstein and
Zin (1991).The results in Table 2 differ numerically from our previous
study given the different moment restrictions imposed on the estimation
problem, but they exhibit the same patterns. The substitution elasticity is
small as is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The rate of time
preference is again large and negative.For nondurable consumption, the
chi-squared test of the seven over—identifying restrictions has a p—value of
approximately 13%, so it would not be rejected at, say, the 10% level. The
nondurables and services measure provides a stronger rejection with a p—value
of i.2'/..
The estimated moments for this model have substantially larger standard
errors than for the expected utility model. As a result, marginal t—tests of
the hypothesis that the moments are individually equal to zero do not reject.
The relatively large values of the joint test statistic, therefore, come from
the correlations across these moment eqiations. Even though these moments
are not estimated very precisely, there are a number of changes In the point
estimates from those obtained for the preceding model. The large negative
autocorrelation in the bond equation error in the expected utility model is
now a small positive correlation. In fact almost all of the moments
Involving the bond error have changed sign.The positive average error for
the bond equation in the expected utility model is now a large negative
average error. However, the pattern of attaching relatively more weight to
the moments Involving the stock return equation and, hence, providing a
21better fit for these moments, is still present.
Weighted Utility
Table 3 presents results for a model with risk preferences that exhibit
first—order risk neutrality (A 1). but are allowed to fan out ( <0)or
fan in ( 0).As one might anticipate given the similarities of the
weighted utility model and the Kreps—Porteus model found in section 4. 1, the
additional parameter introduced by this specification is not well identified.
The value of the objective function typically changes very little with
substantial changes in the values of a and ,.Thelarge standard errors for
the estimates of these parameters is further evidence of this weak
identification. The point estimates indicate fanning out for both data sets,
however, the large standard errors do not allow fanning in to be rejected.
Further the Kreps—Porteus model cannot be rejected using either a t—test of
=0or a likelihood—ratio—type comparison of chi—squared values. The
estimate of the rate of time preference Is positive but the estimate of the
elasticity of substitution is significantly negative Indicating convex
utility of deterministic paths. Given these results it is difficult to
consider this parameterization to be much of an improvement over the
Kreps—Porteus model. In addition, our market data seem to impute little
importance to the fanning pattern of indifference curves, which as noted
earlier, has received considerable attention in the experimental literature.
Disappointment Aversion
We now turn to the results for a model with first—order risk aversion.
We were unable to identify the model with all five parameters (,o,a, and
A), unrestricted. This is not surprising given the nature of the results for
the weighted utility model.Thus, we fix 0 and estimate the remaining
four parameters for the disappointment aversion model.
The evidence in Table 4 indicates that allowing for first—order risk
22aversion greatly improves the performance of the model on many different
dimensions.The point estimates of A are roughly three standard deviations
from A 1,hence, are significantly different from first—order risk
neutrality. These values for A indicate that the representative consumer
attaches roughly three times more weight to disappointing outcomes than to
favorable outcomes. That is, a substantial amount of first—order risk
aversion appears to be necessary to rationalize observed consumption and
asset returns data.The estimates of the substitution elasticity are very
small——substantially smaller than in either the expected utility or
Kreps—Porteus models. The rate of time preference is positive even though
the substitution elasticity is small. A negative rate of time preference is
not needed in this model to match the average levels of returns. In other
words, the modelappearsto be generating sensible results with economically
meaningful values of the parameters.
The over—identifying restrictions test almost never rejects this model.
The potential for a singularity in a system of moment restrictions is always
a concern. However, the matrix in the quadratic form used to construct the
chi-squared test, had a substantially larger condition number (the ratio of
the smallest to largest eigenvalue) in this case than for any of the other
models.It is, therefore, unlikely that the risk of a singularity is greater
than for any of the other models (which typically reject).The estimated
moments and their standard errors indicate that this modelgeneratesmoments
that are much closer to their theoretical value than any of the other
specifications.The pattern of fitting stock restrictions more closely than
bond restrictions is no longer present. The mean of each error appears to be
receiving approximately the same weight and the same is true for the
autocovariances. Overall the empirical performance of this model appears to
bevery good.
The degree of risk aversion implied by the point estimates for the
23disappointment aversion model cannot be summarized by a single number as in
the expected utility model. We can, however, make some risk aversion
comparisons by computing certainty equivalents for simple lotteries for
different parameter values. Table 5 contains some willingness—to—pay
calculations, i.e., the difference between the mean and the certainty
equivalent, for three expected utility certainty equivalents (a =—1,—9, and
—29), and two disappointment aversion certainty equivalents (corresponding to
the estimates from Table 4).The gamble considered is timeless and has two
equally likely outcomes with an expected value of 75,000; the standard
deviation of the gamble increases as one moves down any column of the table.
From these calculations we can see that even for a small gamble, the expected
utility model does not differ much from risk neutrality, even for a 'large'
degree of relative risk aversion, while the disappointment aversion model
displays substantial risk aversion.However, for a range of moderate to
large gambles, the disappointment aversion certainty equivalent corresponding
to A =0.38and a =—1,exhibits less risk aversion than an expected utility
certainty equivalent with a 'moderate' value of relative risk aversion,
a =—9.(See Epstein and Zin (1990) for additional comparisons of risk
aversion along these lines.
We note that what constitutes a 'moderate' or 'large' magnitude for the
degree of relative risk aversion (RBA) is not at all clear. While the
conventional wisdom has until recently held that only values of RRA less than
ten are reasonable (e.g..Mehra and Prescott (1985)),Kandel and
Stambaugh (1990) have raised serious doubts about the validity of arguments
typically invoked to support this view.The disappointment aversion model,
of course, is not immune to this debate. Whether or not one should view the
degree of risk aversion embodied in the results in Table 4 to be implausibly
large, is equally unclear. However,it is clear that since 'large'
second—order risk aversion alone still leads to rejections of the theory, it
24is the 'large' first—order risk aversion that improves the empirical
performance of the model. Although this property is structural in the
context of the representative agent formulation of this paper, there is some
reason to believe that it may be reflecting a feature of the market structure
rather than individuals' preferences. For example, Epstein (1991) presents a
simple example in which an exogenously given, suboptimal risk—sharing rule
leads to community preferences that exhibit first—order risk aversion, even
though all individuals have standard expected utility preferences.There is
also an interesting link between the disappointment aversion model and
stochastic process switching models, to which we now turn.
4.3 Switching Models for Consumption and MRS
When consumption growth exhibits stochastic process switching, expected
utility models generate more plausible asset—pricing predictions (e.g.
Kandel and Stasbaugh (1989) and Cecchetti, LamandMark (1989)).This is
similar to the inclusion of so—called "disaster states" in the consumption
growth process (e.g., Reitz (1988) and Backus, Gregory and Zin (1989)). We
now examine an interesting empirical similarity between these models and the
disappointment aversion model.
Figure 12 plots the cx post realizations for the log of the MRS defined
by (4.2) for the disappointment aversion model using nondurable consumption
and the point estimates of the parameters that correspond to this measure of
consumption from Table 4h1 Figure 13 plots a histogram for this series.
From these two figures we can see two obvious properties of this fIRS: it
exhibits substantialnegative autocorrelation anditsunconditional
distribution is strongly bimodal. A simple reduced form time series
representation with these two properties is a mixture of normal distributions
11
A comparable plot for nondurables and services provides very similar
evidence and is not shown.
25with a two-state Markov chain generating the mixture. That is, a stochastic
switching process of the form considered in the papers cited above.Maximum
likelihood estimates of such a model for the log of MRS are presented in
Table 6 for both consumption measures.12 The parameters in this switching
model are the unconditional probability of being in the high state, p. the
mean and standard deviation in the low state, (g.i, o). the mean and standard
deviation of the high state, 2' and the autocorrelation parameter for
the Markov chain, •13 The negative autocorrelation and bimodality noted in
Figures 12 and 13 are also present in the maximum likelihood estimates in
Table 6. There is substantial separation in the estimates of the two means.
The low mean state is slightly more probable and has a larger variance than
the high state.This pattern is shared by the log MRS for both consumption
measures, though the autocorrelation is not as strong for the nondurables and
services MRS. For comparison the log of the likelihood function is computed
for an i.i.d. normal model as well which has four fewer parameters.
One could construct an expected utility model that would deliver exactly
this behavior in the marginal rate of Intertemporal substitution and, hence,
the same predictions for asset pricing as the disappointment aversion model.
Since the log of the expected utility MRS is a linear function of the log of
consumption growth, applying the inverse of this linear function to the log
of the disappointment aversion MRS produces a consumption growth process that
generates an observationally equivalent expected utility MRS. For example.
postulating a switching process for the log of nondurable consumption growth
12 SInce the discussion in this section is at a somewhat casual level, we
ignore the complications for Inference that may be introduced by the fact
that this series is generated using parameter estimates computed from the
entire sample.






unconditional probability of state I and =1when iJ and 0 otherwise.
26with p =0.4342,8 =—0.2068, 0.0026. p2 =o.iiio,'o =0.0052,and
=0.0044.generates an expected utility marginal rate of substitution
process with =.9975and a—9, that exhibits exactly the same behavior as
the disappointment aversion marginal rate of substitution process in the
first column of Table 6.
For comparison, Figures 14 and 15 plot the log of observed monthly
nondurable consumption growth and its histogram.The log of any expected
utility MRS is a linear function of this process. The second and fourth
columns of Table 6 estimate the parameters of the switching model that fits
observed consumption growth. From the figures and the parameter estimates it
is clear that observed consumption growth does not exhibit the persistence
and bimodality properties that could generate an expected utility MRS that is
similar to the disappointment aversion MRS. The evidence from these data for
the type of stochastic switching process for consumption growth used in
previous expected utility studies, e.g., Cecchetti, Lam and Mark (1989), is
quite weak.However, we have shown that the marginal rate of intertemporal
substitution can exhibit switching-type behavior even If consumption growth
rates do not.The requisite persistence and bimodality of the MRS can be
generated instead by the specification of disappointment averse utility.
6. cONCLUSION
We have shown that some recent developments In the theory of choice
under uncertainty due to Chew (1983. 1989). and Gui (1991), that relax the
independence axiom of expected utility, can be incorporated Into a recursive
asset—pricing model without sacrificing either theoretical or empirical
tractability. We are able to provide the first tests of these new theories
using actual market data rather than laboratory experiments.Our evidence
14Notethat the low state for MRS translates into the high state for
consumption growth.
27indicates that the generalization to weighted utility does not enhance the
explanatory power of our asset—pricing model for the data we consider.On
the other hand, we find that using preferences that exhibit first—order risk
aversion provides a substantial improvement in the empirical performance of a
representative agent, intertemporal asset—pricing model relative to models
that maintain only second-order risk aversion. A model in which the
representative agent's preferences exhibit positive time preference, low
substitutability in deterministic consumption and non—negligible aversion to
small risks, is very difficult to reject.Future research will examine the
robustness of these results by considering other securities such as
individual stock returns and multiperiod bond returns.
28APPENDIX
1. Properties of
Recallthe definition (2.3) of where 0isgiven by (2.4)-(2.5).
Note that #'(l) ) 0 and ''(1)< 0.Thus 0isstrictly increasing and
concave on an interval (abi containing 1.Note also that •(l) =0.(Under
(2.7), the preceding is true for gy positive numbers a and b.
Let F have support in [a,m). Then
J (x/a)dF(x) a J (l)dF(x) 0.
On the other hand, if F has finite mean m, then by Jensen's inequality
JØ(x/m)dF(x)a (l) =0.
Thus there exists a (unique) A such that $0(x/A)dF(x)=0.We define
=A.
Properties (2.1) and (2.2) are immediate. Consistency with first—degree
stochastic dominance and risk aversion follows from the sonotonicity and
concavity of 0.Forexample, if G is a mean preserving spread of F, then
J#(x/p(F))dF(x)0 J0(x/ji55(G))dG(x)
J #(x/p(G))dF(x)=> i5,(F) a
2. Derivation of the Euler equations
Turn to the derivation of the Euler equation (3.4).It follows from
(2.3) and Epstein and Zin (1989. pp. 957—8). that the optimal portfolio share
vector w solves
(A.1) max £01 Bh/PM1/P(c,j/ct)
fl/I,
where is the vector of gross real returns. i , thereturn to
t,1 t,1 t t.1
the market portfolio, and where u
(w1 ø) varies over the simplex
29{w :waDfor all i andw =i}.We will show that, under additional
assumptions, the objective function in (A.l) is differentiable at w end the
associated first-order conditions are given by (3.4).The existence of an
interior optimum is assumed.
Recall the definition (3.6) of z and define
(x(x-i)/a maO,
g(x) .{. xlog(x),a0.




.3 —lI tel t+ltelt (zM wr al}
t+lt+ltel
whereF is the appropriate conditional cdf. Since g is differentiable, the
only potential difficulty arises because the domain of the second integral
depends upon w and because A a 1 in general.
Define
(A.2) i(w) =
J-l T g(z1)dF. {z N wr al}
teltelt+l
Whenthere is positive probability associated with —1, can fail to be
differentiable at to=w.
But under Assumptions I and 2 below, 0is
differentiable there and
(A.3) 0(w) —qt(w)=0,i,j, =1 N.
It then follows that (3.4) represents the first—order conditions for (A.l).
Assumption 1: For each information set at time t, the conditional
distribution of r1 has compact support in the positive
orthant.
30Assumption 2: For each information set at t, there exists an c >0such that
sup-c1Prob((5 :1—c< z < 1+c}) < m. O<cc I 1*1 t.1
A necessary condition for Assumption 2 is that the conditional probability
that z 1 be zero.A sufficient condition is that z have bounded 11 t..I
conditional density function.
One can apply elementary arguments and the fact that g(l) =0to the
difference quotient corresponding to (A.3) to prove the latter.Details are
omitted.
3.Asymptotic properties of the GMM estimator
Turn now to the asymptotic properties of the Gt.4 estimator when A 1.
In this case the objective function is not differentiable. We therefore
employ the results in Andrews (1989a, 1989b) to show how the arguments in
Hansen (1982) can be modified to deal with this nonstandard situation. The
application of these results to our problem is straightforward so we simply
outline the steps involved in deriving asymptotic properties for the GMM
estimator. Note that unlike Andrews (1989a, 1989b), we do not have the added
complication of infinite dimensional nuisance parameter estimation; all of
the parameters In our model are finite dimensional.
Forsimplicity,Consider firstthejust—identifiedcase.Let
a f1f(x,b)be the Sample analogue (for a sample of size T) of the
population orthogonality restrictions based on (4.7), where x1 Is the vector
of variables and b is the vector of parameters. The GMM estimator-, b, is
defined such that f(b) =0and the true value of the parameter vector, b,
IS such that Ef1(b) =0.If a uniform law of large numbers holds for fT(b)
and if b Is IdentifIed, then a standard proof (e.g. ,Hansen(1982) or
Andrews (1989a, Theorem 1.1)) of the consistency of b1 can be constructed
when Ef(b) is continuous.The continuity of this expectation follows from
31the discussion in section 2 of this appendix and will be assumed from here
on.
Since the functions defined in (4.4) and (4.5) are not differentiable in
the parameters of the model, the mean value expansion of fT(bI) at b0, which
is typically used to establish asymptotic normality for the GMM estimator.
does not necessarily exist. We can, however, expand Ef1(b0) at bT since this







where bT is between b1 and b0. This implies that T1"2(bT_bo) is
asymptotically normally distributed If T1"2EfT(bT) ham this property, since
EfT(bo) equals 0 by definition. Note the difference in this result fromthe
1/2
standard argument which says that I (bT_bo) Is asymptotically normally
distributed if T1"2fT(bo) has this property.
Define the empirical process v1(b) v T112(f1(b) —Ef1(b)l.
If this
process has the property of stochastic equlcontlriuity (as defined in
Andrews (1989b)) at b ,andif b is consistent for b ,thenv (I )is
asymptotically equivalent to T(bQ).This in turn implies that T112Ef1(b1)
is asymptotically equivalent to _T1'2fT(bo). since both Ef1(b0) and fT(bT)
are zero by definition. When a central limit theorem holds for T1'2fT(bo) as
in the standard case, it follows that T1'2(bT_bo) is asymptotically normally





An estimator of the matrix of derivatives in this expression can be
constructed using a finite difference of the sample average (as In Pakes and
Pollard (1989)) evaluated at a consistent estimator for b0, provided the
finite difference converges to zero at an appropriate rate as the sample
32size gets large. The variance of the orthogonality conditions in the middle
of this expression can be consistently estimated in the standard way by using
the sample average of f(x1,b)f(x,b)T, evaluated at a consistent estimator
for b
0
Whenthe model is over—identified, b is defined as the minimizer of the
quadratic form fT(b)TWTfT(b), where W isa positive definite matrix that can
depend on the sample size and has a probability limit of W. As In the
Just—identified case, asymptotic normality follows from an expansion of
Ef (b ) T




Ef(b )T Itfollows that when [3
8b
0
] WT1"2f(b)is 0(1)and the Stochastic
equlcontinulty condition holds, T112(b—b) is asymptotically normally
distributed with covariance matrix
(DWD0)_1DW[Var [T1'2f (b )JJ
WD(DTWDYI.
Ef(b) -1 whereD0 =rab
0
WhenW = whereV is equal to Var[T12f(b)}
theasymptotic covariance matrix of the G'1 estimator Is (DV_lD0Y1.This
defines an efficient estimator In the sense that this covariance matrix
differs from the covariance matrix of an estimator defined for an arbitrary
choice of weighting matrix, WT by a positive semidefinite matrix.Further,
for this efficient estimator, TfT(bT)TV_tfT(bT) has a limiting chi—squared
distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions less
the number of estimated parameters. Note that this result differs from the
Ef (b )r
Just—identified case by requiring that [3ôb
0
] WT1'2f(b)converge to
zero in probability as the sample size gets arbitrarily large. When the
objective function is differentiable, the analogous condition to this follows
from the necessary conditions for the optimization problem that defines the
33estimator.Alternatively one can think of the over—identified model as
corresponding to a particular just—identified model (as in Hansen (1982)), by
defining it as the solution to a1f1(b1) =0,where a1 has column dimension
equal to the number of orthogonality restrictions and row dimension equal to
the number of parameters, i.e., the estimator sets a particular linear
combination of the orthogonality restrictions equal to zero. In the
differentiable case, a1 can be thought of as defining the first—order
conditions. In the nondifferentiable case,when a1 converges to
Ef (b ) T
[3 ôb ° ]
W,the asymptotic results discussed above will hold without any
additional assumptions. Therefore, constructing a Just—identified GNM
estimator for the linear combinations of the orthogonality restrictions given
1.3Ef(b )T
by a consistent estimator of L3b J
Wresults in an estimator that is
asymptotically equivalent to the estimator based on the minimization of the
Ef (b ) T
quadratic form and the requirement that [3ôb° ]WT1'2f1(b1)
=o(i).
The results discussed above rely on the stochastic equlcontinuity of the
empirical process.Sufficient conditions for this in a time series context
that can be applied to our model are given in Andrews (1989b). Note that the
functions that we deal with involve his type I and type III functions
(indicator functions and power functions).
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Figure 12: Disappointment Aversion Iog(MRS)
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Figure 13: Histogram for Disappointment Aversion Iog(MRS)
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Figure 14: Log Consumption Growth
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Figure 15: Histogram for LogConsumptionGrowth
1990Table 1: Expected Utility










Moment Fitted Value Weight (x107) Fitted Value Weight (x107)
E(eM) —0.1355 0.0012 -0.0697 0.0038
(0.0554) (0.0297)
E(c5) 0.1285 0.0001 0.1224 0.0001
(0.0702) (0.0710)
E(cMcM ) —0.0047 12.530 —0.0011 125.71
(0.0011) (0.0003)
E(cmcm ) —0.0483 0. 1595 —0.0292 0. 1909
(0.0089) (0.0062)
E(CMCB ) 0.0180 1.4398 0.0077 4.8541 -i
(0.0035) (0.0017)
E(c5cM ) 0.0145 1.3587 0.0055 5.0839 -1
(0.0031) (0.0014)
E(cNcN 1 —0.0003 10.464 -0.0001 101.83 -2
(0. 0010) (0. 0003)
E(CBCB ) 0.0022 0. 1413 0. 0043 0. 1501 -2
(0.0096) (0.0079)
E(eNcB 1 —0.0027 1.3898 -0. 0004 4. 4613 -2
(0.0029 (0.0014)
E(cBcH ) 0.0026 1.3898 -0.0001 4.2351 -2
(0.0030) (0.0015)
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors, asymptotic p—values, and constrained
parameter values are denoted by 1'),('I, and(},respectively. and C
denote the Euler equation errors for the stock and bond returns. Estimated
moments and their standard errors are multiplied by 100. "Weight' is the
diagonal element of the weighting matrix used to compute the estimator.Table 2: Kreps—Porteus Utility











Moment Fitted Value Weight (x108) Fitted Value Weight (xlO°)
E(eM) —0.0949 0.0003 —0.0474 0.0013
(0. 1643) (0.0704)
E(c5) —0.2316 0.00004 —0.2386 0.00004
(0.4584) (0.4319)
E(cMcM ) -0.0038 5. 7739 —0. 0012 17. 674
(0.0074) (0. 0016)
E(c5c5 ) 0.0083 0. 1310 0.0041 0. 1650
(0.0544) (0.0538)
E(cMc8 ) —0.0018 0.8460 —0.0021 5.0732
(0.0203) (0.0094)
E(CBCN 1 —0.0049 0.9062 -0.0039 5.7790
(0.0198) (0.0090)
E(cMcM ) —0.0002 6.7000 —0.0001 17.525
-2 (0.0072) (0.0014)
E(c8c5 ) -0.0039 0. 1334 —0.0063 0. 1477
-2 (0.0526) (0. 0504)
E(cMc5 ) -0.0039 0.9603 —0.0014 5.2289
-2 (0.0195) (0.0086)









Table 3: Weighted Utility















































































Notes:See Table 1.x2(7)—x2(6) is a likelihood ratio—type test of the
6 =0restriction.Table 4: Disappointment Aversion












Moment Fitted Value Weight (x107) Fitted Value Weight (x107)
E(c5) —0.1218 0.0004 —0.0144 0.0004
(0.0300) (0. 0449)
E(c5) -0.1148 0.0002 —0.0011 0.0004
(0.0760) (0.0381)
E(cMcM ) —0.0008 1.0073 —0.0001 1.0137
(0.0019) (0.0027)
E(t8c8 ) 0.0013 0.2282 0.0002 1.9470
(0.0051) (0.0011)
E(cMc8 ) 0.0003 0.4152 0.0003 1.0731
(0. 0035) (0. 0021)
E(c5eM ) —0.0009 0.5218 0.0001 1.6679 -1 (0.0035) (0.0019)
E(cMcM ) 0. 0002 1.3457 0. 0000 1.3624
-2 (0.0022) (0.0024)
E(c6e5 ) 0.0003 0.2187 —0.0003 1.8554
-2 (0.0057) (0.0017)
E(c5c5) —0.0005 0.5823 —0.0001 1.8445 -2 (0.0037) (0.0022)
E(c5c5) —0.0002 0.4978 —0.0005 2.4838 -2 (0. 0036) (0. 0022)


















250 1 4 12 113 140
2.500 83 410 1.091 1,189 1,575
25,000 8,333 21.009 23,791 17,017 23,028
40.000 21,333 37,198 39,153 31,707 38,602
50,000 33,333 47.999 49,395 42.937 49,001
60,000 48,000 58,799 59,637 55,139 59.401
74,000 73,013 73,920 73,976 73,624 73,953
to pay to Notes:Entries give the willingness avoid a gamble with equally
likely outcomes given initial wealth equal to 75,000.Thus, for each i
anda, the appropriate entry is 75,000—M(), where equals 75,000±c with
probability 1/2.Table 6: Switching Models for log(MRS)
Nondurables Nondurables and Services
Parameter log(HRS) Jog(c/c) iog(flRS) log(c/c)
p 0.4342 1.0050 0.3135 0.9963
(0.0220) (0.1134) (0.0230) (0.0619)
0 -0.2068 0.1444 -0.0959 0.1794
(0.0532) (0.2252) (0.0526) (0.1198)
p —0.0010 0.0011 0.0162 0.0017
1 (0.0039) (0.0004) (0.0052) (0.0003)
0.0467 0.0079 0.0532 0.0045
(0.0027) (0.0003) (0.0036) (0.0002)
-0.9763 0.0014 -1.2791 0.0020
(0.0029) (0.0025) (0.0029) (0.0006)
0. 0400 0. 0016 0. 0434 0. 0010 2 (0.0021) (0.0050) (0.0020) (0.0003)
loglik(switching)355.4 1,144.4 344.5 1,332.8
loglik(i.i.d.) —231.0 1,142.9 —302.9 1,330.7
Notes:p is the unconditional probability of state 1, 0 is the simple
persistence parameter, p, o are the mean and standard deviation In state I,
1=1,2. Standard errors are in parentheses.